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ABSTRACT: This article examines the impact of general
revenue sharing on three structural features of American
federalism: (1) governmental entities (number and employ-
ment) ; (2) institutions and actors’ roles; and (3) behavioral
perspectives. Revenue sharing will probably inhibit the
further proliferation of special districts, sustain some town-
ships that might atrophy, increase public employment levels,
and foster or accentuate the secular shift of state govern-
ment toward a service-oriented component of the federal
system. General revenue sharing is both a cause and an effect
of pluralistic power patterns. It is an important resource
for political-administrative generalists in counteracting the
influence of functional or program specialists. The generalist
coalition, however, exhibits fragile features when compared
with the strengths of policy making subsystems in Washing-
ton. Existing competitive, taut, and tension-laden inter-
governmental relationships are in part the product of partic-
ipants’ perceptions. General revenue sharing appears to have
relaxed tense relations by altering behavioral perspectives.
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FOR purposes of this discussion,JL the structural features of
American federalism have been
placed into three broad group-
ings. This simplified classification
scheme sacrifices many nuances and
finely textured aspects present in the
complex patterns of American inter-
governmental relations. It also inter-
prets the term structure in a loose,
unconventional sense. The three-
fold scheme allows and fosters atten-
tion to far-reaching, long range
developments in United States fed-
eralism. Trends and tendencies are
examined in the specific context of
how they may or may not be affected
by the forces set in motion by the
adoption of the State and Local Fis-
cal Assistance Act of 1972, other-
wise known as general revenue
sharing.
The three structural categories
used as organizing themes are: (1)
governmental entities; (2) political
institutions and actors; and (3) be-
havioral perspectives. Brief indica-
tions and descriptions of the three
features follow.
Governmental entities refer to
the units of government that exist
and operate in the multijurisdic-
tional framework of the United
States political system. Units or
types of governmental jurisdictions
are the basic building blocks of
American federalism. These units
have.legal-corporate existence, func-
tional distinctiveness, and political
significance that compel attention
in any treatment of United States
federalism. The conventional cate-
gories of governmental entities are,
in addition to the national govern-
ment : states, counties, munici-
palities or towns, townships, school
districts and special districts.
A second structural feature of
United States federalism is the re-
lationship among and between
major political institutions and their
leading actors. The political insti-
tutions on which this article centers
are the chief executive, the legisla-
tive branch, and the administrative
establishment. The primary insti-
tutional actors considered are:
elected executives, legislators, gen-
eralist administrators, and program
professionals (sometimes called
functional specialists). Note that
political and administrative gen-
eralists have been singled out as
actors apart from the program or
functionally-oriented professionals.
Special attention is paid to the past
and present relationships between
these two broad types of actors and
to the effects of general revenue
sharing on future role relationships.
A third structural characteristic,
behavioral perspectives, emphasizes
the views, outlooks and orientations
of the participants in the inter-
dependent, intergovernmental sys-
tem. It may seem unusual, even a
strain on the word structural, to
apply the term to the perspectives
of persons. Its utility and appro-
priateness is suggested on two
grounds. First, the views or outlooks
of governmental officials toward
each other tend to form consistent
patterns, that is, a structure of atti-
tudes. Second, officials’ views
toward events, problems, policies,
and each other shape or structure




What have been the trends in the
number of governmental units in
recent decades, and how may gen-
eral revenue sharing affect these
trends? Table 1 provides 1942 to
1972 figures on governmental enti-
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TABLE 1
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1942-1972
SOURCES: U.S., Bureau of the Census, Governments in the United States 1, no. 1, 1957
Census of Governments; Governmental Units in 1972, Preliminary no. 1, 1972 Census of
Governments.
ties by type of unit. Several trends
are evident from scanning the row
figures. The totals show a marked
decrease from more than 150,000
units in 1942 to less than 80,000 in
1972. For our purposes it is neces-
sary to look beyond the totals to the
trends by type of unit.
It is apparent that the overall de-
cline in units is explained by the
disappearance of more than 90,000
school districts in 30 years. School
districts, as units, are not eligible to
receive general revenue sharing
funds. It is therefore unlikely that
the trend toward school consolida-
tion, which may have run its course
in any case, will be affected an iota
by the presence or absence of rev-
enue sharing.
A second pronounced trend
among governmental units is the
proclivity toward proliferation of
special districts. Like school dis-
tricts, special districts are ineligible
for general revenue sharing funds,
but, in contrast to school patterns,
increases have been the consistent
trend in special districts. The num-
ber has nearly tripled in three de-
cades and almost doubled in two.
During the recent short span of five
years (1967 to 1972), more than 2,600
special districts were created, an in-
crease in excess of 12 percent.
The enactment of revenue sharing
legislation took account of special
district proliferation, at least in-
directly, by limiting its availability
to a &dquo;unit of general government.&dquo;
Hence, the term general revenue
sharing. To the degree that general
revenue sharing was intended to
forestall further jurisdictional pro-
liferation, it is legitimate to raise
questions about its efficacy in this
respect. A case for revenue sharing’s
preventing proliferation rests on two
major presumptions: (1) that most
special districts have been created
because of financial constraints,
such as tax limitations; and (2) that
revenue sharing has provided
enough funds to ease the pressures
toward jurisdictional proliferation.
In this author’s judgment, these con-
ditions apply in sufficient measure
to blunt the trend of increasing
special districts. In short, I would
predict fewer new special districts
from 1972 to 1977, although lesser
increase will not all be attributable
to general revenue sharing.
Fewer new units may be one
slight impact of revenue sharing,
despite the difficulty of demonstrat-
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ing it directly. But will revenue
sharing lead to some reduction or
consolidation of existing units? Here
the prospects and predictions are
especially elusive. A recent survey
of 250 local governments disclosed
that in six instances the existence
of revenue sharing funds prompted
consideration of changes in govern-
mental jurisdiction, all in the direc-
tion of consolidation. Thus, about
two percent of the units sampled
were &dquo;considering&dquo; structural
change. The discrepancy between
consideration and actual achieve-
ment in the arena of jurisdictional
change should be underscored. Sig-
nificant reductions in the number of
governmental entities because of
general revenue sharing are there-
fore unlikely.
One other impact of revenue shar-
ing on numbers of units remains
for comment: Will it preserve any
units that might otherwise disappear
or be consolidated? Three types of
jurisdictions are relevant to this
question: counties, municipalities
and townships. The durability,
strength and familiarity of county
government make it unlikely that
revenue sharing will constitute a
single or significant factor in pre-
serving the existence of any county.
The fate of county consolidations
hinges on forces far more critical
than the annual distributions of
about $1.25 billion among more than
3,000 counties. This sum represents
less than nine percent of all gen-
eral revenues (from own sources)
of county governments in 1972.
Will general revenue sharing pro-
mote the preservation of cities and
townships? This question is often
posed as encouraging the retention
of uneconomical and inefficient
jurisdictions. Judgments about
which units fall in this suspect cate-
gory are, of course, debatable and
even volatile. The multiple and
complex issues cannot be resolved
in this discussion, but a few facts
can be submitted and a prediction
made.
Municipalities receive about 35
percent of the $5 to 6 billion in
annual revenue sharing distribu-
tions. This share, nearly $2 billion,
is approximately 8 percent of all
general revenue raised by munici-
palities from their own sources in
1972. The existence of this marginal
but noteworthy proportion could
affect the inclinations of officials in
a small number of jurisdictions to
resist efforts to consolidate or elimi-
nate their municipalities. Indeed,
the trend for 30 years has been a
modest, consistent increase in the
number of municipalities through
new incorporations. With few excep-
tions, these new cities have been
created within Standard Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). The
effects of revenue sharing on the
number of municipalities is seen as
very slight and marginal. It is im-
probable that revenue sharing will
promote any new incorporations, but
in a few instances it may be a periph-
eral factor in promoting the preser-
vation of a few towns or cities.
The township is the only type of
general government unit that has
shown a consistent decline over
three decades. Nearly 2,000 town-
ships have ceased to exist as entities.
This decline is more a function of
Census Bureau definitions and judg-
ments than governmental restructur-
ing and consolidation. Townships,
which are concentrated in the North
Central states, have long been con-
sidered remnants of surveyors’
1. Comptroller General of the United
States, Revenue Sharing: Its Use by and Im-
pact on Local Governments, 25 April 1974
(B-146285), p. 26.
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maps. With the exception of a few
located in suburban areas, town-
ships have been on the decline.
General revenue sharing legisla-
tion is channeling about $250 mil-
lion annually to townships. This is
nearly 10 percent of all township
general revenues from own sources
in 1972. Among all types of govern-
mental entities, revenue sharing
will most likely have its greatest
impact on townships insofar as af-
fecting trends in numbers of units.
An identifiable result of revenue
sharing will probably be to arrest
a decline in the number of town-
ships. The merits of this result, if
accurately predicted, are beyond the




The number of entities is but one
feature of governmental structure. A
second is the size and relative mag-
nitude of governmental types as
measured by full-time employment.
Available data permit the charting of
employment by major types of
entities for more than two decades.
Figure 1 depicts the respective pat-
terns by jurisdictional type from
1951 through 1973. The logarithmic
scale allows comparisons of rates of
change, according to the slope of
trend lines, but still identifies ab-
solute levels of full-time equivalent
employment.
Table 2 presents in tabular form
the two-decade trends and the levels
for the most recent year available
(1973). For those not already familiar
with employment patterns, figure 1
and table 2 make apparent the
prominence and dominance of local
governments in the public sector.
Because of small magnitudes, the
employment levels and trends for
townships and special districts are
omitted for figure 1.
More than half of the 12.6 million
public employees in 1973 are with
local governments. Furthermore,
nearly half of all local employment
is in school districts. One other ob-
servation about current levels
should be noted: the employment
levels of national and state govern-
ments have approached each other,
and, if the current trend continues,
state employment will soon exceed
that of the national government.
Changes in employment during
the past decade are indicative of
secular shifts in the structure of rela-
tions among governmental levels.
According to Census Bureau com-
putations, there have been marked
contrasts in the year-to-year (annual)
percentage changes in public em-
ployment, depending on the type of
jurisdiction. The annual percentage
increases from 1962 to 1972 were:
counties, 4.5 percent; municipali-
ties, 3.1 percent; townships, 4.1 per-
cent ; special districts, 4.6 percent;
school districts, 4.7 percent; and
state governments, 5.3 percent.2 2
During the recent decade of
growth, the rate of county employ-
ment substantially exceeded the
growth rate for municipalities. The
contrasting growth rates of the two
types of entities undoubtedly re-
flect the impact of suburban growth
throughout the nation. More specifi-
cally they reveal the role of county
governments, especially those in
SMSAs, in responding to demands
for urban-type services. At the local
level the growth rate for special
districts (4.6 percent) slightly ex-
ceeds the county rate and, not sur-
prisingly, the rate for school employ-
ment is the highest for this 1962 to
1972 period. The 4.7 average annual
increase resulted from the school
population surge during this decade.
2. U.S., Bureau of the Census, Public Em-
ployment in 1973, Series GE73-No. 1, p. 2.
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Perhaps the most noteworthy fea-
ture of the above percentages is
the figure for state government.
By growing at 5.3 percent per year,
the states were the most dynamic
component of public sector employ-
ment. This rate of increase, as well as
the confluence of numerous other
forces in the intergovernmental sys-
tem, led the various observers to
argue that the states are &dquo;where the
action is.&dquo; The upward thrust of state
activity, as represented by employ-
ment, can be observed from the
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TABLE 2
FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT EMPLOYMENT BY GOVERNMENTAL JURISDICTION
SELECTED YEARS, 1952-1973
(in millions)
SOURCE: U.S., Bureau of the Census, Public Employment in 1973, Series GE73-No. 1, p. 8.
trend lines in figure 1 where visual
comparisons of contrasting recent
trends are permitted. The slope of
the state line is at a greater incline
than those for other government
jurisdictions.
In what way(s) is revenue sharing
likely to affect trends in the respec-
tive roles of governmental units
and the structure of public employ-
ment ? The first general conclusion
is that it will affect trends only
marginally. That is, revenue sharing
is about five percent of state and
local budgets. This proportion is
diluted even further in its impact
on employment levels when rev-
enue sharing funds are used for
capital outlay rather than for operat-
ing purposes. Only in the latter case
is there substantial and continuing
impact on public employment.
Apart from a modest or marginal
impact, will there be any differential
employment effects of revenue shar-
ing by type or unit? The following
predictions seem likely differential
effects:
1. Jurisdictions under the greatest
financial pressure will use pro-
portionately more money for
operating purposes and pro-
duce proportionately greater
increases in public employ-
ment.
2. Municipalities are more likely
to use funds for operating pur-
poses than are counties and
townships, with an accompany-
ing greater increase in public
employment.
3. Larger jurisdictions are more
likely than smaller units to use
the money for operating (and
public employment) purposes.
School districts and special dis-
tricts are ineligible to receive rev-
enue sharing funds; no capital out-
lay or operating and employment
purposes by these types of units
should be expected. Two sources -
may produce indirect effects from
revenue sharing on school districts.
First, state governments may decide
to use some funds from revenue
sharing for school purposes, either
operating or capital outlay. Second,
counties or cities are permitted, if
they so choose, to spend revenue
sharing money for school capital out-
lay. Restrictions in the law prohibit
paying operating expenditures for
school purposes.
Three predictions are offered
above regarding the differential im-
pact of revenue sharing monies as
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they may affect allocations for op-
erating purposes and impact on
public employment levels. Can the
accuracy of these predictions be
assessed within the short existence
of revenue sharing? Initial short
term data from six-months actual-use
reports and annual employment
figures allow a provisional assess-
ment of the predictions.
The proportion of revenue sharing
funds expended for operating pur-
poses during the first six months of
the program were: states, 94 per-
cent ; counties, 44 percent; cities,
56 percent; and townships, 52 per-
cent.3 The differences among types
of local units are not momentous.
The lager proportion for cities is
consistent with prediction 2 above,
and also with prediction 1 if it is
assumed that cities are more finan-
cially hard-pressed than counties or
townships. There is evidence to sug-
gest that this latter condition does
apply.
How is it possible to explain the
exceptionally high proportion (94
percent) that the states have allo-
cated to operating outlays? Are the
states under greater fiscal pressures
than local units? This would not
appear to be the case if reports
about state surpluses are true, and
especially the indication that in 1973
state governments reduced taxes by
a net of $500 million.4 There is,
however, considerable evidence to
show that the states have been in an
intergovernmental fiscal vise during
the past 10 or 15 years. The middle-
man role of the states in the federal
system has subjected them to severe
financial pressures from above (na-
tional) and below (local units). The
pincers-type fiscal squeeze on the
states derives from five fiscal dilem-
mas which the states have con-
fronted and to which they have re-
sponded with herculean tax efforts.5
For example, between 1958 and
1972 state tax revenues increased
from $14.9 to $59.9 billion, or a net
rise of $45.0 billion. During the same
period, state aid to local units in-
creased by $28.7 billion, and state
funds required to match rapidly
rising federal aid increased by an
estimated $16.0 billion.&dquo; In effect,
states made prodigious tax efforts,
the apparent result of which was
barely to match intergovernmental
claimants from below and above.
One other data series confirms the
distinctive fiscal role of the states
and indicates the allocational pres-
sures they have faced. Figures cited
below are ratios of capital outlays
to operating expenditures from 1963
to 1973 for direct spending by level
of government. Table 3 provides the
arrays of ratios by governmental
level. During the decade, capital
outlay/operating expenditure ratios
for the national government ranged
from 15 to 32 with no discernable
trend. For all local units the ratio
ranged from 29 to 22 with a modest
and somewhat consistent trend
downward. For the states, however,
3. U.S., Department of the Treasury, Office
of Revenue Sharing, Revenue Sharing: The
First Actual Use Reports, 1 March 1974,
pp. 8-13.
4. See, "Fiscal Affluence for State and
Cities," New York Times, 3 December 1972;
"Study Predicts Local Revenue Surplus,"
Washington Post, 1 October 1973; Tax Foun-
dation, "State Tax Action in 1973," Tax
Review 34, no. 9 (September 1973); Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Information Exchange Service, "The 1972
State-Local Fiscal Surplus," No. 73-1 (Jan-
uary 1973).
5. Deil S. Wright and David E. Stephen-
son, "The States as Middlemen: Five Fiscal
Dilemmas," State Government 47, no. 2
(Spring 1974), pp. 101-107.




RATIOS OF CAPITAL OUTLAYS TO OPERATING
EXPENDITURES FOR NATIONAL, STATE,
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
1963-1973
SOURCE: U.S., Bureau of the Census, Gov-
ernmental Finances in 1972-73, Series GF
73-No. 5, Table 5; and previous years.
a major, consistent, and significant
downward trend occurred.
These ratios identify a major turn-
about in the character of state spend-
ing. In 1963 state capital outlays
were nearly two-thirds of current
operations expenditures. The actual
amounts were, respectively, $8.1
and $12.4 billion. By 1973 the ratio
was only one-third, and the amounts
were $14.7 billion for capital out-
lays and $44.8 billion for current
operations. In sum, the states have
moved rapidly and dramatically
from capital-intensive outlays to the
support of service-intensive pro-
grams. This shift, combined with
other forces, has produced the rapid
increase in state-level employment.
The states’ actual-use reports,
showing more than 90 percent of
revenue sharing allocated for cur-
rent operations, supports one con-
tention and one prediction. The
first is that the states appear to
remain under service-intensive
pressures. Second, it seems that
revenue sharing will permit, and
perhaps accentuate, the trend away
from capital-intensive state govern-
ments.
Annual employment data for 1973
do not provide a firm or clear base
for assessing the differential im-
pacts of revenue sharing on public
employment among local entities.
Perhaps the full effects of the in-
fusion of revenue sharing funds are
not reflected in the fall 1973 em-
ployment data. All three eligible
types of local jurisdictions sub-
stantially increased their employ-
ment levels in comparison to their
1962 to 1972 average. The 1972-
73 percentage increases were:
counties, 8.2 percent; cities, 4.7 per-
cent ; and townships, 7.4 percent.
If these recent rates are compared,
respectively, to the 1962 to 1972
trends, the resulting ratios are:
counties, 1.8; cities, 1.5; and town-
ships, 1.8. The ratios represent in-
cremental shifts, or departures from
trend.
These figures provide the basis for
two observations. First, the one-year
availability of revenue sharing has
contributed to greater growth rates
in local public employment trends.
Second, there do not appear to be
sharp differences in the incremental
effects among types of local units.
One remaining prediction, num-
ber 3, remains for comment. We
observed that larger jurisdictions
will probably use general revenue
sharing funds more for operating
purposes, and this will subsequently
be reflected in higher employment
growth rates. Data on employment
increases by size of unit are not
available, but information from the
first actual-use reports lends pro-
visional support to the prediction.
According to the analysis of the
reported data, &dquo;The general pat-
tern... supports the conclusion
that larger units of government,
especially counties and cities, have
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spent a greater proportion of their
revenue sharing funds for operating-
maintenance uses while smaller
units have spent a larger propor-
tion on capital items. &dquo;7
INSTITUTIONAL AND ACTORS’
ROLES
The American political system has
been aptly described as one of dis-
persed power. The two major struc-
tural (and constitutional) means of
parceling out political power are:
(1) separation of powers, and (2)
federalism. The former usually
draws attention to the national ex-
ecutive, legislative and judicial
branches and covers not only the
partition of power, but also ac-
companying checks and balances.
The latter interlevel distribution of
authority, sometimes called division
of powers, has usually been ap-
proached from the standpoint of
centralization-decentralization.
Many analyses of United States
federalism have emphasized cen-
tralizing trends, and often these are
based on a conception of power
distribution similar to that of a zero-
sum game. That is, if one level,
player, or intergovernmental actor
gains power, that gain is compen-
sated by an equivalent loss of power
by another participant. It is the in-
tent of this brief discussion of in-
stitutional power distributions, ac-
tor roles, and revenue sharing to
suggest: (1) the need for integrating
any analysis of federalism with that
of separation of powers; and (b) the
limitations of the zero-sum model to
intergovernmental relations.
It has been a common practice
among students of federalism to
employ metaphors to clarify and
simplify the nature of interlevel re-
lationships. Thus, so-called layer
cake federalism stood for the separa-
tism and exclusive powers doctrines
that were thought to describe United
States intergovernmental relations
during the 19th and early 20th
centuries. The layer cake characteri-
zation was succeeded by the marble
cake metaphor. Studies of United
States intergovernmental relations
in the 1940s and 1950s disclosed
a complex, inextricable intertwining
of relationships among jurisdictions
and intensive interaction among
public officials from the various
jurisdictions.’
New metaphors have been pro-
posed and explored as more graphic
and attention-demanding ways of
coping with the complexities and
challenges that confront the nation.
The one submitted here as the more
accurate and current characteriza-
tion is so-called picket fence federal-
ism. The term is drawn from the
text of Terry Sanford’s Storyn Over
the States.9 Sanford describes the
difficulties he faced as governor
of North Carolina in controlling,
coordinating, and coping with the
influence of program professionals
and their like-minded professional
allies at the national and local levels.
These programmatic alliances were,
to Sanford, like so many vertical
pickets laid upon the horizontal
slats of the national, state and local
governments. A graphic representa-
tion of Sanford’s metaphor is pro-
vided by figure 2. The vertical links
consist of shared loyalties by pro-
7. Office of Revenue Sharing, First Actual
Use Reports, p. 23.
8. Edward W. Weidner, Intergovernmen-
tal Relations as seen by Public Officials
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1960); Morton Grodzins, The American Sys-
tem : A New View of Government in the
United States, ed. Daniel J. Elazar (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1966).
9. Terry Sanford, Storm Over the States
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 80.
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gram professionals that ignore or
transcend the level of government
at which they are currently em-
ployed. Perhaps the most potent
connector creating and confirming
the vertical alliances has been the
federal categorical grant-in-aid.
Elsewhere this author has labeled
the picket fence phase of inter-
governmental relations so aptly
described by Sanford as &dquo;competi-
tive.&dquo;I° The competition is twofold.
First, there is competition between
and among the program profes-
sionals, as for funds, jurisdiction,
program primacy and political sup-
port. Second, and of greater signifi-
cance, is the competition between
the program professionals and the
governing generalists, that is, legis-
lators and chief executives. The
executives include both elected and
appointed officials-governors and
state budget directors, mayors and
city managers, elected county ex-
ecutives and county managers.
The contrast in orientations be-
tween program professionals and
governing generalists is strong and
significant. The generalists are
oriented primarily toward a level-of-
government orientation. They nor-
mally do not neglect or disparage
program considerations, but their
prime roles are coordination, con-
trol, and securing balance among
programs. This frequently sets them
in opposition to program profes-
sionals, regardless of level.
The character of the cleavage be-
tween the two sets of actors has been
described in various ways by both
10. Deil S. Wright, "Intergovernmental
Relations: An Analytic Overview," THE
ANNALS 416 (November 1974), pp. 1-16.
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participants and semi-detached ob-
servers. A city manager once con-
veyed to the author that his city was
&dquo;little more than a battleground
among contesting federal agencies
and I sit here like a spectator in
the stands watching them fight.&dquo;
Another quotation, less influenced
by the heat of battle, came from
Senator Muskie-not, by chance,
a former governor. &dquo;The picture,
then, is one of too much tension
and conflict rather than coordina-
tion and cooperation all along the
line of administration-from top
Federal policymakers and adminis-
trators to the state and local profes-
sional administrators and elected
officials.&dquo;11
What has revenue sharing to do
with this abstract and admittedly
somewhat simplified version of in-
stitutional and actor roles? The
relationship is both strong and one
of cause as well as effect. General
revenue sharing can be viewed as
the dollar representation of an
alliance among generalists, es-
pecially executives, at all levels to
counteract the accumulated in-
fluence of the program professionals.
In the framework of figure 2, rev-
enue sharing can be seen as a con-
test between the Big Seven, repre-
senting the generalists, and the
&dquo;determined dozen.&dquo;
The latter is merely a figurative
reference to the numerous sets of
program professionals typified by
the 12 vertical &dquo;pickets&dquo; shown in
figure 2. The precise number of
vertical functional alliances is some-
what indeterminate, although it is
thought to be associated with the
number of categorical grant-in-aid
programs which are currently esti-
mated at 450. The Big Seven refers
to the seven associations listed at the
bottom of figure 2. Collectively these
associations of public officials are
also called the Public Interest
Groups, or PIGS. 12 The PIGs share
a generalist, level-of-government
orientation with strong executive-
centered tendencies.
General revenue sharing was, in
large measure, &dquo;caused&dquo; by the
executive-generalist coalition de-
scribed above.l3 No one can read
the accounts of its passage and the
testimony of state and local execu-
tives at congressional hearings with-
out appreciating the effectiveness
with which the generalists sold
the case for revenue sharing. The
natural question in the context of
this predictive-oriented analysis is
what effect general revenue sharing
will have on the continued viability
of the executive coalition. There are
several dimensions to the question,
but only two deserve comment here.
First, will revenue sharing in its
initial five-year form provide state-
local generalists, particularly execu-
tives, with notably increased leverage
in relation to program profession-
als ? Both logic and fragmentary
evidence suggest that it has en-
hanced the role of executives in
determining priorities and influenc-
ing policy. There is some doubt
as to whether the same can be
said for legislators such as state
representatives, county commis-
sioners and city councilmen.
The critical question, however, is
how the recent and current ex-
perience with revenue sharing is
11. U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional
Record, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, 112,
p. 6834.
12. See, "Public Interest Groups," Public
Management 53, no. 12 (December 1971);
and Richard E. Thompson, Revenue Sharing:
A New Era in Federalism (Revenue Sharing
Advisory Service, 1973), pp. 45-53.
13. Thompson, Revenue Sharing, pp. 86-
123.
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linked to generalists’ behavior in
the near future. The revenue shar-
ing legislation expires in 1976. Will
this role advantage and other gains
from revenue sharing be of sufficient
magnitude to provide a powerful
impetus among generalists to press
for extension of the legislation be-
yond 1976?
There is reason to doubt that
the advantages from revenue shar-
ing to executives and legislators are
sufficiently strong to generate the
same intensity of pressure that re-
sulted in the 1972 act. Much will
hinge on unknown political condi-
tions in 1976, but a necessary condi-
tion for the extension of revenue
sharing is the potency of the execu-
tive-generalist alliance. In 1972
the need for money was the cement
that held governors, mayors, and
other officials of all political hues
and conditions together in support
of general revenue sharing. Mone-
tary need alone will probably be
insufficient to generate support for
revenue sharing extension. An im-
portant additional element for bind-
ing the generalist alliance will be
institutional-a stronger conception
of their common role.
There is a second dimension of
the institutional question regarding
the position of the generalist coali-
tion. Its character, concerns, and
potential strength have been dis-
cussed largely in terms of its base
at the state and local levels. Its capa-
bilities for impacting on policy mak-
ing at the national level must also be
assessed. Here we move consider-
ably beyond the short term question
of whether revenue sharing will be
renewed. Will the generalist coali-
tion, born in part by negative reac-
tions to categorical grants and flex-
ing its muscles on the passage of
revenue sharing, reach political
maturity on the pluralistic and frag-
mented Washington scene? Of
course, this question cannot be
answered now. Our present aim
is modest and minimal, namely, to
provide a clearer understanding of
the problem.
The starting point of this analysis
is a significant but unappreciated
proposition put forward by the tem-
porary (1953-55) Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations. In a
chapter discussing &dquo;National Re-
sponsibilities,&dquo; the commission
agreed on the summary assertion
that, &dquo;In brief, the policymaking
authorities of the National Govern-
ment are for most purposes the
arbiters of the federal system.&dquo;14
The national &dquo;authorities&dquo; referred
to were the courts, the president,
Congress and the administrative
agencies of the executive branch.
Granting the validity of the com-
mission’s contention leads us in
search of a model or generalized
description of policy making at the
national level. Such a model would
help identify and assess any pros-
pects for influence exerted by the
generalist coalition of state-local
officials.
One well-documented and widely
accepted model of national policy
making is the so-called policy sub-
system. Studies in various program
and policy areas have identified
the strength of relationships among
administrative agencies, congres-
sional committees or subcom-
mittees, interest or clientele groups,
and professional associations.15
14. Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
lations, Report to the President for Trans-
mittal to Congress (June 1955), p. 59.
15. J. Leiper Freeman, The Political
Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Com-
mittee Relations (New York: Random House,
1965); Lewis C. Gawthrop, Bureaucratic Be-
havior in the Executive Branch: An Analysis
of Organizational Change (New York: Free
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The interactions among individuals
from these four components consti-
tute the policy making subsystem.
The intensity and like-mindedness
generated from these exchanges
produce bureau autonomy, frag-
mentation, and pluralism at the na-
tional level.
From a program and organiza-
tional standpoint, the consequences
of this pattern are that all significant
phases of policy making except
official approval fall within the do-
main of the policy making subsys-
tem. The visual representation of
the subsystem is shown in figure 3.
The diagram is entitled &dquo;Influences
on National Policy Making and
Administration&dquo; because it attempts
to plot, map or identify the primary
interacting sources and forces that
affect outcomes on policy issues at
the national level. The closed, co-
hesive, insulated and autonomous
character of the relationships sug-
gests several simplified terms for the
subsystem: reinforcing rectangle,
self-directing diamond, and solidi-
fied square.
The messages, if not all the impli-
cations, are clear: to impact on na-
tional policy making the generalist
coalition must bypass, break, or
coopt various elements of the policy-
making subsystem. Opportunities
for success by following any one or
a combination of these three strate-
gies depends on a large set of
variables-historical, accidental,
and otherwise. General revenue
sharing can be viewed as a bypass
strategy. Other generalist efforts,
particularly those revolving around
special revenue sharing (grant con-
solidation) and grant reforms rely
on cooptation strategies.
The prospects for frontal as-
saults to break up a subsystem
are unlikely because of subsystem
strengths. Those strengths derive
from several sources, including: (1)
the highly specialized nature of most
administrative agencies; (2) the re-
sistance by functional specialists to
policy initiatives that will diminish
their effective control; (3) the pro-
tective or paternalistic view taken
by a congressional committee or
subcommittee toward an agency
under its jurisdiction; (4) the
strength of congressional tradition in
deferring to committee judgment;
and (5) the links between the func-
tional specialists at all governmental
levels through (a) grantor-client
relationships or (b) contacts and
similar outlooks generated by com-
mon professional training and/or
associations. The last item is a
variant form of the picket fence
vertical-alliance formulation with an
added feature. The existence of pro-
fessional associations, norms, and
standards provides additional in-
sulation for the policy making sub-
system. It reinforces subsystem
autonomy in intergovernmental
programs through the separate or
joint effects of horizontal (peer-
group) forces.
To what extent will general rev-
enue sharing contribute to a surge
of influence on the national policy
making landscape as described
above? First, an earlier implication
about the Public Interest Groups
should be acknowledged. These
associations of generalists, the Big
Seven, are not newcomers, novices,
or weaklings on the Potomac scene.
Their existence, roles, and selective
influence have been the subject of
numerous commentaries and at
Press-Macmillan, 1969); Francis E. Rourke,
Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969); Harold
Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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least two thoughtful appraisals. 16
The concern here is how much
&dquo;glue&dquo; revenue sharing has pro-
vided as a basis for holding the
entire generalist coalition together
and for pyramiding the influence
exerted in the passage -of the 1972
legislation.
Without extensive elaboration and
justification, I predict that revenue
sharing will not significantly en-
hance the prospect for state-local
leverage on policy making subsys-
tems at the national level. Several
factors contribute to this conclusion.
Four prominent ones may be cited.
First, there are great variations in
jurisdictional size and needs, as well
as officials’ outlooks within each of
the Public Interest Groups. Second,
there are institutional strains be-
tween or among the associations-
for example, governor’s conference
16. Suzanne G. Farkas, Urban Lobbying:
Mayors in the Federal Arena (New York:
New York University Press, 1971); Donald
H. Haider, When Governments Come to
Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Inter-
governmental Lobbying (New York: Free
Press, 1974).
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relationships with the state legis-
lators’ association. Third is the ab-
sence of a unifying ideology, policy
focus or constituency (apart from
more dollars), as seen in the lack
of urbanism as a binding political
base for the passage of legislation. 17
A fourth limitation is the institu-
tional incapacity of Congress to
assess and act on intergovernmental
questions, particularly as national
actions produce multiple-order ef-
fects throughout the complex in-
terdependent federal system. For
example, the House and Senate com-
mittees on intergovernmental rela-
tions are subcommittees of parent
committees on government opera-
tions whose jurisdiction is posterior
to substantive legislation and in-
volves mainly legislative oversight.
In an unusual and striking power
shift, however, the House Subcom-
mittee on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions has obtained jurisdiction over
renewal of general revenue sharing.
Whether this subcommittee desires
or can wield &dquo;generalist&dquo; authority
remains to be seen.
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES
Examined above are governmental
entities as well as institutional
and role relationships as structural
features of federalism in relation
to revenue sharing. The follow-
ing treatment of behavioral perspec-
tives is briefer in focus and compass
for several reasons, not the least
of which is a limited amount of
data on officials’ perceptions of their
own and others’ behavior in inter-
governmental contexts. The scope
and significance of behavioral per-
spectives are of such magnitude that,
in the brief space remaining, little
more can be done than to call atten-
tion to the topic and convey an
appreciation for its prominence in
intergovernmental affairs.
A few surveys are extant that re-
port distributions, invariably at one
point in time, on how some officials
view the actions and responses of
others. In 1965 the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions posed an extensive battery of
questions to more than 100 national
administrators of federal grant
programs .18 Two perspectives rele-
vant to this discussion were notable
among a wide-ranging set of find-
ings from the survey. First, the
federal officials expressed doubts
and made negative comments about
the professional competence and
commitment of state and local ad-
ministrators. Second, and more sig-
nificantly, the subcommittee report
noted: &dquo;Elected policymakers at the
state and local level [generalists]
were identified-either clearly or
obliquely-as the villain in the
drama of intergovernmental person-
nel relationships. The national ad-
ministrators opposed giving these
elected officials greater flexibility,
which might result in needed
changes in state and local personnel
policies.&dquo;19
A second survey, also taken in
1965, examined the attitudes of city
managers in large council-manager
cities. It specifically requested
managers’ views on the coopera-
tiveness and results of contacts with
officials at the national and state
levels. The managers reported that
17. Frederic N. Cleaveland, "Congress and
Urban Problems: Legislating for Urban
Areas," Journal of Politics 28, no. 2 (May
1966), pp. 289-307.
18. U.S., Senate, Subcommittee on Inter-
governmental Relations, The Federal System
as seen by Federal Aid Officials, 89th Cong.,
1st sess. (Committee Print), 15 December
1965.
19. Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations, Federal System, p. 13.
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national officials were slightly more
cooperative than state officials. 20
When the results of intergovern-
mental contacts were evaluated,
however, the relationships with
national officials came out clearly
more favorable than those with the
state. Essentially similar findings
were disclosed by a more recent
study.21 Of 802 chief administra-
tive officers responding to a 1969
survey, 38 percent reported that
the federal government was more
helpful in dealing with city prob-
lems. This contrasted with 21 per-
cent indicating state officials were
more helpful. Significantly, 27 per-
cent reported that neither federal nor
state officials were helpful. This last
substantial proportion is probably an
indication of the tension, rivalry and
dissatisfaction present in the mazes
of intergovernmental interactions.
Selective perspectives of national
and local officials provide touch-
points in two of the three major
planes of government. A few data
points have also been established
within the third plane, state govern-
ment. Two or three attitude ele-
ments are especially noteworthy
among top state administrators. For
example, approximately 90 percent
of state agency heads indicated
either strong or moderate agreement
that &dquo;it is very important that rela-
tionships between the national
government and local units be
channeled through the states.&dquo;22
State officials exhibit, in this re-
sponse pattern and in others, a
&dquo;strong state&dquo; bias. The states and
their officials, according to this view,
are not merely intermediaries,
middlemen or facilitators, but are
keystones in arches forming the
intergovernmental system.
Responses by state administrators
to other questions revealed the pres-
ence of substantial negative or less
favorable attitudes toward national
and local officials. For example,
nearly one-third disagreed with a
statement suggesting that more
authority and discretion be granted
to local units of government.23 Gen-
erally speaking, it is fair to say that
state administrators indicated a sub-
stantial degree of doubt or skepti-
cism about the views of intergovern-
mental actors at other levels.
These data identify within the
three planes of governments the
attitudes of tension, doubt, skepti-
cism and concern present among
one set of actors as they perceive
intergovernmental actors in the
other planes. There is a graphic
approach to portraying the presence
of the contrasting and competitive
features present in the participants’
perspectives described above. Fig-
ure 4 shows visually how national,
state and local officials perceive the
position and perspectives of the
other participants in the inter-
governmental bargaining-exchange
process. The perspectives are dia-
grammed by the inverted-pyramid,
diamond, and hourglass shapes.
Each geometric pattern is a simpli-
fied representation of how a na-
tional, state or local official sees
his own and other participants’
perspectives.
For example, national officials
judge their own views of problems
20. Deil S. Wright, "Intergovernmental
Relations in Large Council-Manager Cities,"
American Politics Quarterly 1, no. 2 (April
1973), p. 168.
21. International City Management Asso-
ciation, "Federal, State, Local Relation-
ships," Urban Data Service 1, no. 12 (De-
cember 1969), p. 4.
22. Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid:
Perspectives and Alternatives (Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1968),
p. 124. 23. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid, p. 124.
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and policies as broad, extensive,
circumspect and wide-ranging.
When national officials assess the
outlooks of state-level officials, they
judge them as having more limited
and narrower perspectives, ones
that do not match the breadth,
scope and quality of the ones they,
the national officials, hold. National
officials see local officials as holding
a highly restricted, particularistic,
even parochial set of perspectives.
Local officials might be caricatured
as &dquo;pipsqueak mayors&dquo; or &dquo;fly-by-
night city managers.&dquo; A less extreme
but real-life occurrence of this pat-
tern of perceptions surfaced shortly
after the 1967 Detroit riot. A mid-
level federal career official told
Governor George Romney of Michi-
gan and Mayor Jerome Cavanagh
of Detroit that he knew better than
they the likely causes and cures for
Detroit’s community conflagration.
State officials’ perspectives form
a diamond shape. They judge their
own positions and outlooks as wide-
ranging, potent, and broadly appro-
priate to the problems they face.
Put differently, state officials see
themselves sitting athwart the fed-
eral system. They see the views of
national officials as constricted, nar-
row, and inappropriately attuned to
the special circumstances and con-
ditions of their particular state. Like-
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wise, state officials view the per-
spectives of local officials as limited,
particularistic, and insufficiently
broad in scope.
At the local level, intergovern-
mental perspectives conform to an
hourglass shape. Local officials see
common and compatibly broad out-
looks shared by local and national
participants; but at the state level
they see narrow and limiting per-
spectives as dominant. This fits
the frequently mentioned charge by
local officials that the states are the
bottlenecks of the entire system. An
alternative, hydraulic-oriented criti-
cism is that the states are funnels
rather than tunnels. The constricted
character of the states as conduits,
according to local officials, helps
explain the increased bypassing of
the states in direct national-local
flows of funds. These direct national-
local dollars are estimated at about
$6 billion in 1974, excluding gen-
eral revenue sharing.
These graphic characterizations of
officials’ perspectives are unques-
tionably crude and insufficiently
attentive to variations by types of
officials and the diversity among
the units. The prime point is not to
offer the diagrams as uniform and in-
variant descriptions but to empha-
size the presence of contrasting out-
looks among differently situated
officials. Equally important is the
degree to which each participant
sees the others as having outlooks
different from his own. The aggre-
gate effect of these multiple and
contrasting perspectives is a pattern
of cleavages and competition. This
can be noted visually if all three
geometric shapes are overlaid. The
result is a jagged jumble of lines
and patterns producing the tension
and rivalry labeled above as the cur-
rent competitive phase of inter-
governmental relations. Stated dif-
ferently, there is a great deal of
tightness in the system and a lack
of slack resources by which the
taut sinews of the system can be
eased.
In the framework of the above
formulation, revenue sharing has
undoubtedly made a major contri-
bution to easing or loosening the
pressures on beleaguered state and
local officials. In the cute and only
half-jesting quip of one mayor, &dquo;Rev-
enue sharing is my security blan-
ket !&dquo; Almost by definition, general
revenue sharing makes an important
contribution to a relaxation of in-
tergovernmental tensions. In the
geometry of officials’ perspectives s
depicted in figure 4, it should help
round off the sharp points present in
attitude patterns. To that extent
revenue sharing has had, and will
continue to have, positive effects on
the structure of officials’ inter-
governmental perspectives.
CONCLUSION
Three structural features of Ameri-
can federalism are examined above
in an effort to assess and predict
the impact of general revenue shar-
ing. The three structural character-
istics are: (1) governmental entities;
(2) institutions and actor roles; and
(3) behavioral perspectives.
The probable short and long term
effects of general revenue sharing on
the number of governmental units
are modest and marginal. By favor-
ing units of general government,
revenue sharing may blunt the pro-
liferation of special districts. At the
same time, it will likely have a
preservative effect on some town-
ships that might otherwise atrophy
and disappear as operating entities.
The effects of revenue sharing on
public employment are noteworthy
in three respects. First, there is a
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positive correlation between the use
of revenue sharing for operating pur-
poses and the size of jurisdictions,
as well as the degree of fiscal pres-
sure on units. Second, operating out-
lays are reflected more directly in
public employment increases, and a
recognizable rise in employment did
occur even in the first year of
revenue sharing. Third, revenue
sharing is likely to foster and even
accentuate the secular shift of state
government from a capital-intensive
to a service-intensive component
of the federal system.
General revenue sharing is both a
cause and an effect of the pluralistic
and fragmented patterns present in
the structures of separation of
powers and federalism. The frag-
mented features of federalism re-
volve around a cleavage between
political-administrative generalists
and functional or programmatic
specialists. Revenue sharing is the
generalists’ answer to the accretions
of influence by the specialists. There
is considerable doubt as to whether
it has provided a firm base from
which the executive-generalist coa-
lition can mount sufficient efforts
to extend revenue sharing and ac-
cumulate influence to apply to other
issues. The fragile features of the
generalist orientation are shown in
sharper relief when compared and
contrasted with the policy making
subsystem at the national level. The
autonomy, insulation and strength of
the reinforcing rectangle are im-
portant barriers to the potency of
the Public Interest Groups on the
Potomac scene.
Perhaps the most abstract and un-
appreciated effect of general rev-
enue sharing has been some reduc-
tion in the tension, competition and
rivalry pervading the relationships
among intergovernmental actors.
Patterns of intergovernmental per-
spectives exacerbate taut relation-
ships. Revenue sharing has fur-
nished and, if extended, will con-
tinue to provide slack or a cushion
against which many of the harsher
blows resulting from intergovern-
mental collisions will be appre-
ciably softened.
